Western Michigan University

ScholarWorks at WMU
Honors Theses

Lee Honors College

4-14-2005

Image Restoration and the "Black Sox" Scandal of 1919:
Corrective Action as an Ideal Image Restoration Model for
Professional Baseball
Zachary J. Walsh
Western Michigan University, zwalsh@hotmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/honors_theses
Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
Walsh, Zachary J., "Image Restoration and the "Black Sox" Scandal of 1919: Corrective Action as an Ideal
Image Restoration Model for Professional Baseball" (2005). Honors Theses. 1464.
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/honors_theses/1464

This Honors Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for
free and open access by the Lee Honors College at
ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please
contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

Western Michigan University
The Carl and Winifred Lee Honors College

THE CARL AND WINIFRED LEE HONORS COLLEGE

CERTIFICATE OF ORAL EXAMINATION

Zachary J. Walsh, having been admitted to the Carl and Winifred Lee Honors College in Fall 2001
successfully presented the Lee Honors College Thesis on April 14, 2005.

The title of the paper is:

"Image Restoration and the 'Black Sox' Scandal of 1919"

Dr. Keith Hearit, School of Communication

Mr. Matt Kurz, IzJnivejsity Relations

1903 W. Michigan Ave.
PHONE: (269) 387-3230 FAX: (269) 387-3903

Image Restoration and the "Black Sox" Scandal of 1919

Corrective Action as an Ideal Image Restoration Model for Professional Baseball

Zachary J. Walsh
Undergraduate Honors Thesis
Lee Honors College

Western Michigan University
April 14, 2005

Image Restoration and the "Black Sox" Scandal of 1919

Corrective Action as an Ideal Image Restoration Model for Professional Baseball

The game had been in trouble for several years already. Attendance was in decline
and rumors of fixing had caused injury before. The Black Sox Scandal seemed

destined to ruin baseball as a professional sport entirely.
Stephen Jay Gould (Asinof, 1963, p. xviii)

After the previously indomitable Chicago White Sox lost the 1919 World Series to the
Cincinnati Reds, speculations of foul play abounded. With each suspicious game, the notion of a

possible conspiracy to throw the Series became more widespread, reaching its pinnacle when the
impossible happened and the Chicago defeat became official (Asinof, 1963). Finding it
necessary to address the concerns of the public, Chicago White Sox President Charles A.
Comiskey promptly positioned himself as spokesperson for his club. He immediately began to

manage the pending crisis through public statements made via media outlets, primarily
newspapers. At this point, the allegations of a fix had not been properly investigated, much less
proven. Comiskey used the media to distance himself and his organization from the alleged
incident and the eight players mentioned in connection to it. He also assured the legions of

baseball fans and other stakeholders in the United States that his organization would do all it
could to bring the truth to light and vowed that any guilty parties would be forever removed from
the game. Public relations scholars would classify Comiskey's statements and the corresponding
actions to vindicate them as examples of dissociation and corrective action strategies employed
by an organization as part of a crisis management campaign (Hearit, 1994, 1995; Benoit, 1994,

1995, 1997; Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997). The
objective of Comiskey's campaign was to return baseball and the White Sox organization back to
level of respect it enjoyed prior to the "Black Sox" scandal.

This paper examines Comiskey's campaign to restore the images of both his club and the

larger institution of professional baseball after the 1919 World Series scandal. It analyzes and
evaluates the discourse used in the campaign in relation to established theories of image

restoration. In doing so, the paper demonstrates that the crisis discourse utilized by the White
Sox owner represents an image restoration campaign relying entirely on examples of corrective

action, with elements of dissociation used as means to achieve corrective action objectives. The
paper also identifies Comiskey's tactics as part of an image restoration campaign paradigm for
professional baseball in times of organization-threatening crises and explains the social motif of

removal and restitution that enables such a strategy to be effective. Today's professional
baseball spokespersons can look to Comiskey's strategy as a roadmap by which they may restore

the images of their respective organizations. Today's professional sports organizations face
constant public and media pressure due to the harsh realities of the current sports climate, the
most prominent current scandal being the abuse of steroids and other performance-enhancing

drugs. Using the plan Comiskey enacted after the "Black Sox" scandal as a paradigm for
successful image restoration, one may conclude the best course of action for today's baseball
spokespeople is to clearly identify the problematic individuals, dissociate them from the larger
organization, then effectively articulate, disseminate, and enact a plan to remove the "rotten"

players from the game, thereby restoring the integrity of the organization in the eyes of its
publics, primarily the fans. This paper explains in detail exactly what constituted Comiskey's
plan and how today's professionals can benefit by following his example.

To accomplish this purpose, the first section of the paper outlines the six basic strategies
available to individuals wishing to restore an organization's image during and after a crisis. The
second establishes a setting for the 1919 World Series crisis situation and explains the conditions
that led up to it. The third segment of the paper describes the two stages of Comiskey's image
restoration campaign and the tactics used in each. This section also explains the social motif that
allowed Comiskey to succeed in his image restoration efforts. The final portion of the paper
recounts the assertions made in the previous sections and extrapolates upon them, drawing
connections to today's professional sports world.
The Roster: Image Restoration Tactical Options
When presented with a crisis, organizations wishing to restore their institutional image
must address the concerns of their stakeholders. In doing so, organizations may employ a

number of different strategies. According to one popular theory, there are five basic image
restoration strategies: denial, evasion of responsibility, reduction of offensiveness, corrective
action, and mortification (Benoit 1994, 1995; Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Brinson & Benoit 1996;

Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997). In his research, Hearit (1994, 1995) discusses dissociation as

another available strategy. The following paragraphs will discuss the facets of the strategies
listed above.
Denial

A strategy of denial has been employed when a corporation either states that the act in
question never occurred or states that it did not commit the act (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997;
Benoit, 1994). Two tactics have been identified under the denial umbrella. Coca-Cola used the

first strategy, known as simple denial, in 1991 when rival Pepsi-Cola accused the soft-drink giant
of charging McDonald's restaurants lower rates than those assessed to other clients. Coca-Cola

responded to the allegations by issuing a statement saying that Pepsi-Cola's accusations "were
absolutely false" (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997, p. 40). Coca-cola thus directly and simply denied
the charges against it. A second form of denial is to shift the blame for the wrongful acts to
another body. Exxon used this strategy when it was held responsible for delays in the cleanup
efforts after its ship Valdez ran aground in 1989, spilling millions of gallons of oil into Prince
William Sound. In response to the allegations, Exxon's chairman "blamed state officials and the
Coast Guard for the delay, charging that the company could not obtain immediate authorization
on the scene to begin cleaning up the oil or applying a chemical dispersant" (Benoit &
Czerwinski, 1997, p. 40-41). By shifting the blame away from itself to another entity, Exxon
attempted to restore some of the damage done to its image in the wake of the spill.
Evasion ofResponsibility
Organizations that cannot deny an act may nevertheless pursue image restoration by
evading responsibility. The tactics included as measures by which to implement this strategy are

used as attempts to "dodge or reduce responsibility for the wrong-doing" (Kennedy & Benoit,
1997, p. 198). Four such tactics have been identified: provocation, defeasibility, accident, and
good intentions.

Provocation. When using the first method, provocation, an organization asserts that its
actions were reasonable in that they were a response to the actions of another body (Benoit,
1995, 1997; Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996;

Kennedy & Benoit, 1997). An example of provocation, according to Benoit and Czerwinski
(1997), would be if a company said it refused to cooperate with another business because the
other business had been disinclined to cooperate in the past. In doing so, that former would be

trying to evade responsibility for its own actions by claiming they were the result of the actions
of the latter.

Defeasibility. In evading responsibility through defeasibility, the next implementation of
the strategy, an organization claims the act in question occurred because the company, through
no fault of its own, lacked either information about or control over the event in question (Benoit,
1995, 1997; Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996;

Kennedy & Benoit, 1997). For example, a company accused of not complying with new federal
regulations would exemplify the defeasibility tactic if it were to say it had not been notified that
the regulations had changed (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997, p. 41).
Accident. The third responsibility evasion tactic is to claim the event in question was an
accident. This claim suggests the act was beyond the organization's control, thus the
organization should retain less accountability (Benoit, 1995, 1997; Benoit & Brinson, 1994;

Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Kennedy & Benoit, 1997). An example of
this strategy is found in former Sears chairman Edward Brennan's classification of allegedly

inaccurate auto-repair charges as "inadvertent" (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997, p.41). By using this
terminology, Brennan claimed that any overcharges were accidental.

Good intentions. A fourth method of evading responsibility is by invoking a good
intentions tactic that allows the organization to say it committed the offensive behavior, but did
so in an attempt to accomplish a positive goal (Benoit, 1995, 1997; Benoit & Brinson, 1994;

Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Kennedy & Benoit, 1997). Sears also
demonstrated this tactic in the case mentioned above. Chairman Brennan issued a statement

saying that his organization "would never intentionally violate the trust customers have shown in

our company" (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997, p.42). In doing so, he asserted that Sears had not
meant to overcharge its customers and that its intentions were good.
Reduction of Offensiveness

Organizations also may attempt to restore their images by claiming the alleged misdeeds
are not as bad as they may seem. This is the reduction of offensiveness strategy of image
restoration discourse. Six tactics fall within this strategy: bolstering, minimization,

differentiation, transcendence, counterattack, and compensation. Each of the six tactics attempts
to lessen the offensiveness of the questionable acts as perceived by the organization's key
publics (Benoit, 1995, 1997; Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson &

Benoit, 1996; Kennedy & Benoit, 1997).

Bolstering. When an organization highlights its good aspects in an attempt to reinforce
the positive opinion that an audience already holds for the corporation, the organization has
demonstrated the bolstering tactic of image restoration (Benoit, 1995, 1997; Benoit & Brinson,

1994; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Kennedy & Benoit, 1997). AT&T

exemplified this tactic during the campaign that followed accusations that it was responsible for
a 1992 long distance service interruption that caused millions of calls to be blocked and brought
about a plethora of problems for air travelers in the New York City area. As part of his crisis

discourse, company chairman Robert E. Allen's reiterated the corporation's long-time
commitment to providing customers the best and most reliable service possible (Benoit &

Brinson, 1994). This reinforcement of the company's goals reminded the public of what AT&T
stands for in an attempt to repair some of the damage done to its corporate image.
Minimization. Another tactic organizations may use to reduce perceived offensiveness is
to minimize the negative feelings resulting from an offensive act (Benoit, 1995, 1997; Benoit &

Brinson, 1994; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Kennedy & Benoit, 1997).

An example of this tactic is found in the following statement from Sears chairman Brennan
during the case described earlier in this section. Brennan said, "With over 2 million automobile

customers serviced in California alone, mistakes may have occurred" (Benoit, 1995, p. 96). With
this statement, Brennan put the overcharging incidents into perspective, insinuating that when

compared to the total number of customers served, the "mistakes" were not as significant as they
appeared (Benoit 1995, p. 96).

Differentiation. Organizations also have the option to reduce offensiveness through
differentiation, in which they create a clear separation between the act in question and other,
more offensive acts. This tactic also played a role in the aforementioned example involving
Sears. The accusers claimed the overcharges were partially due to Sears' practice of adhering to
sales quotas. The company responded to the quota allegations by saying the so-called "quotas"

were actually "sales goals" designed to meet public needs, a far less offensive categorization
(Benoit 1995, p. 95). Sears implemented this change in nomenclature to show its publics that the
acts in question were really not as offensive as the accusers had made them appear.
Transcendence. Transcendence is another tactical option available to organizations

facing a crisis. According to Benoit and Czerwinski (1997), transcendence is "placing the act in
a more favorable context, either a broader context or a different frame of reference" (p. 43).
Dow Corning exemplified transcendence in the image restoration campaign it implemented after

being accused of producing breast implants that it knew to be unsafe. A large part of this crisis
revolved around documents allegedly proving Coming's knowledge of the potential harm its
products caused to customers. A spokesperson for the company referred to the documents as "a

normal part of business activity" (Brinson & Benoit, 1996, p. 35). This statement placed the

documents in a larger organizational context in an attempt to reduce them to "nothing more than
simple business" (Brinson & Benoit, 1996, p. 35).
Counterattack. When the credibility of the allegations' source is questionable,

organizations can attempt to reduce the offensiveness of an act through counterattack, sometimes
called attacking the accuser. When implementing this tactic, organizations challenge the
credibility of the source and therefore the validity of the charges (Benoit, 1995, 1997; Benoit &

Brinson, 1994; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Kennedy & Benoit, 1997).

According to Kennedy and Benoit (1994), former Speaker of the Senate Newt Gingrich used this
tactic in 1994 when he was accused by then House Majority Whip David Bonior of putting his
own interests ahead of those of the public. Gingrich responded to the allegations by implying

that Bonior and other Democrats had brought the allegations upon him in an attempt to discredit
him because he was a threat to their "old order" ideals. By attacking his accusers, Gingrich
attempted to reduce the offensiveness of the allegations against him.
Compensation. When a company reimburses the victim of the offensive act with "goods,
services, or money to help mitigate the negative feeling arising from the act," it employed the

compensation tactic of reducing offensiveness (Benoit & Czerwinski 1997, p. 43). In 1992 for
instance, as an attempt to restore the image of his business, a movie theater official gave free

passes to a group of disabled individuals who had been denied admittance to the theater (Benoit
& Czerwinski, 1997; Benoit 1997).
Corrective Action

In addition to the other strategies mentioned in this section, organizations in crisis may
turn to a strategy of corrective action as a way accomplish their image restoration goals. The

primary discourse accompanying this strategy is a promise from the organization to take action

to ensure that the problem that caused the offensive act will be corrected or that the act itself will
be prevented from happening again (Benoit, 1995, 1997; Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Benoit &

Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Kennedy & Benoit, 1997). AT&T relied on
corrective action discourse after the service disruption crisis mentioned earlier. Company
chairman Allen informed the public that AT&T had identified the cause of the problem and that
a full-scale investigation was underway. He stated the investigation would seek to determine

what the specific cause of the disruption had been so the problem could be fixed and a similar
incident would never occur again (Benoit, 1994, p. 81). By assuring the company's stakeholders
that a repeat incident was impossible, Allen attempted to restore AT&T's image.
Mortification

Another strategic option for organizations caught in a crisis is to admit responsibility for
the wrongful acts and make a plea for forgiveness. This is the reduction of offensiveness tactic
identified as mortification (Benoit, 1995, 1997; Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Benoit & Czerwinski,

1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Kennedy & Benoit, 1997). AT&T had no other choice but to

include this tactic in the image restoration campaign it implemented in the long distance service
disruption case mentioned earlier. Chairman Allen delivered the following statement to the
media in response to the charges that AT&T was at fault for the service outage: "I am deeply
disturbed that AT&T was responsible for a disruption in communications service" (Benoit &
Brinson, 1994, p. 81). With this statement, Allen admitted that his organization was at fault and
made no attempt to minimize AT&T's responsibility for what happened or reduce the severity of
the incident (Benoit & Brinson, 1994, p. 81).
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Dissociation

The list of image restoration strategies and tactics discussed to this point is that of Benoit
and his colleagues. This list is however not fully comprehensive of all the strategies and tactics
that have been identified by researchers. The following section details another image restoration

strategy, that of dissociation, which has been identified by Hearit (1994, 1995), who adds three
dissociation tactics to the list of options available to organizations facing crises. According to

Hearit, corporations engage in dissociation when they "attempt to distance themselves from the
wrongdoing" (1994, p. 119). He defines three types of dissociation: opinion/knowledge,
individual/group, and act/essence.

Opinion/knowledge. An opinion/knowledge dissociation may be applied when the facts
surrounding a situation are in question. In this type of dissociation, an organization asserts that
the allegations against it are based on "opinions" that are not indicative of the "facts" of the
situation (Hearit 1994, 1995). The Chrysler Corporation implemented what Hearit would define
as an opinion/knowledge dissociation as part of its strategy to repair the damage to its image
after it was accused of selling previously test-driven cars as "new." The company claimed the

perception of disengaged odometers as an "executive perk" was not in accordance with the facts,
and said the odometers were disconnected as a "road testing" program (Hearit 1994). Chrysler
thus dissociated opinion from knowledge.

Individual/group. The second type of dissociation Hearit identifies is individual/group.
Companies that use this kind of dissociation "claim that individuals acting without organizational
sanction are responsible for the wrongdoing" (Hearit, 1994, p. 119). By identifying these
individuals, an organization "can label a part of its identity 'rogue' and, in the process, mitigate

its guilt by scapegoating its employees" (Hearit, 1995, p. 8). Individual/group dissociation is a
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useful tool when the validity of the accusation itself is not in question, as it would be in an

opinion/knowledge dissociation (Hearit, 1994; 1995). Toshiba used this type of dissociation to
separate itself from its subsidiary ToshibaMachine Company in 1987 when accusations arose
that the latter had sold top-secret equipmentto the Soviet Union. Toshiba referred to its

subsidiary as "ToshibaMachine Company" or merely "TMC" to separate itself from its
subsidiary and make clearthe idea that "TMC" and not Toshibawas under attack. "TMC" was
thus dissociated from the larger Toshiba corporation; the individual was separated from the
group (Hearit, 1994, p. 120).

Act/essence. An organization will use a dissociation of the act/essence variety if it has

"no option but to acknowledge that some wrongdoing has occurred" (Hearit, 1994, p. 120).

When this happens, a corporation claims that the act in question does not represent the values
and principles for which the organization stands. In this type of dissociation, the company
essentially states that the act in question was an aberration not at all indicative of the company's

normal proceedings. According to Hearit (1994), this type of dissociation is largely dependent

upon denial of intent. Volvo used an act/essence dissociation when it was charged with
"deceptive advertising" in 1990 (p. 120). The company argued that the advertisement in

question was "in no way reflective of how it generally does business" (p. 120). Volvo thus
dissociated the offensive act from the essence of the organization.

This preceding section of this paperdiscussed six image restoration strategies available to
organizations facing crises. The strategies that have been identified are: denial, evasion of
responsibility, reduction of offensiveness, corrective action, mortification and dissociation. A
number of tactics falling under the broader strategy categories were also discussed. The image

restoration strategies and related tactics listed herein will be used to critically examine the
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discourse of Charles Comiskey in his attempts to restore the image of the Chicago White Sox

organization in the wake of accusations that several of his players had conspired to fix the 1919
World Series.

Pre-Game: Conspiracy-Conducive Conditions

Prior to the United States' entrance into World War I in 1917, professional baseball was

the biggest entertainment business in America (Asinof, 1963). While the Great War was being
fought overseas, American gamblers fought their own battle at home, against boredom. As a

result of the war, many horseracing venues were shut down, forcing the gamblers and bookies
who lived and died on the ponies to find another activity to occupy their time. They turned to
baseball. Consequently, by the end of World War I, baseball gambling had grown to

monumental proportions (Asinof, 1963). In the fall of 1919, the nation's attention turned from
the conflict overseas back to the action on America's baseball diamonds. The 1919 World Series

would be the first fall classic since the end of WWI. The seemingly unstoppable Chicago White

Sox of the American League would face the severely out-manned Cincinnati Reds of the

National League. The general conception of the public was that a Chicago victory was inevitable
(Asinof, 1963, p. 5).

Bookies and bettors were not the only ones affected by the increase in baseball gambling;
ballplayers also were very much involved. In 1919, players throwing games was not a new

phenomenon (Asinof, 1963, p. 10). Only two years earlier, the same Chicago White Sox team
preparing to play in the upcoming World Series had been part of an underhanded plot to win the

American League pennant. Almost every player was "openly assessed" $45 under the auspices
of rewarding two Detroit Tigers pitchers for beating Chicago-rival Boston in an important series.
The money actually was used to bribe the two pitchers to lose games against the White Sox
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themselves (Asinof, 1963, p. 20). Another harbinger of pending massive corruption was the case
of Cincinnati first-baseman Hal Chase and his activities during the 1917 season. According to

Eliot Asinof in Eight Men Out (1963), Chase "became adept at making faulty plays" (p. 14). He
mastered the art of making his teammates look bad, thereby giving the opposing team a
significant advantage while maintaining his own image. Chase sacrificed the integrity of the
game so he could make a few extra dollars betting against his own team. He was eventually
exposed and put on trial, only to be acquitted and continue his career with another club (pp. 1415). These examples represent only a portion of the illegal activity that permeated baseball at
this time in the game's history. Inside gambling thrived in professional baseball in the seasons
preceding the 1919 campaign. Asinof (1963) asserts that at this time many gamblers "openly
boasted that they could control ball games as readily as they controlled horse races" (p. 13). Of
course, not all ballplayers were involved in the corruption, but those who remained clean quickly
realized they could do nothing to stop the decline of the game (pp. 13-14). The stage was set for
the most colossal scam in baseball history.
In 1919, the Chicago White Sox had very nearly become the quintessential baseball club.

The team boasted dominant pitching, powerful hitting, and excellent fielding. The only elements

the team lacked were satisfied players and team unity. On any other team, the slugger
"Shoeless" Joe Jackson, "commonly rated as the greatest natural hitter the game had ever seen,"
would have made far more than what Comiskey paid him (Asinof, 1963, p.l 9). The same was
true for the majority of Jackson's teammates. Asinof (1963) writes, "[Comiskey's] ballplayers
were the best and were paid as poorly as the worst" (p. 15). This situation was compounded by
the fact that this was the "take-it-or-leave-it" contract era of professional baseball in which
players had only two choices regarding their contracts; they could either play for what the owner
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offered, or not play at all (p. 21). Many of the White Sox players were none too eager to find a
way to supplement their relatively meager incomes. Their contempt for Comiskey's frugal

salary practices was multiplied by the players' disdain for the lavish expenditures their boss
made on reporters in order to win favor with them (Asinof, 1963, p. 21). Comiskey's priorities
were clear to all involved, especially the players, who greatly resented their boss and his miserly
attitude toward their compensation. The salary situation may not have been the sole motivating
factor for the players to go through with the World Series fix, but it certainly contributed to their

willingness to consider such a heinous act. The other championship component the 1919 White
Sox club lacked was team unity. Unknown even to their fans, the team was divided into two

cliques, separated as such for a variety of mostly personal reasons. Eventually, these groups
would evolve into the players involved in the fix and those who were unaware of it (Asinof,

1963). The two factors that made Chicago an unlikely championship candidate would
overwhelm the club's many positive attributes and ultimately result in a World Series defeat.

Three weeks before the 1919 Series was to begin, professional gambler Joseph "Sport"
Sullivan approached White Sox first-baseman Arnold "Chick" Gandil and promised him $80,000

(Gandil's salary was $4,000 at the time) for himself and a select group of teammates if the Sox
lost the Series (Asinof, 1963, pp. 19-20). This meeting put into motion the events that would
eventually result in Gandil and seven other White Sox conspiring to throw the heralded
culmination of the national pastime's 1919 season. Gandil's group of disgruntled players
purposely lost the first two games of the Series. The Sox "rallied" for a victory in the third on
the arm of young pitcher Dickie Kerr, who was untouched by the scandal. Cincinnati took
Games 4 and 5, giving the National League squad a 4-1 advantage (the 1919 World Series was

the only best-of-nine contest in major league baseball history). At this point, the outlook was not
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good for the White Sox, both on the diamond and off, where it had become apparent that the
crooked players had been double-crossed by the men who were supposed to finance the fix
(Asinof, 1963). Partially out of spite for not receiving promised compensation, Chicago claimed
victories in the next two games, putting the team down only four games to three. Desiring a

quick and favorable outcome, the gamblers assured themselves victory by extorting Chicago
starting pitcher Lefty Williams with threats of harm to his wife if the Reds did not win the game.
Williams let four runs cross the plate in the top of the first inning, effectively giving away the
World Series title; the White Sox lost the Series in eight games (Asinof, 1963). American

League President Ban Johnson would later call the throwing of the Series "the greatest crime it
was possible to commit in baseball" ("Baseball leaders won't," 1921).
The World Series is the pinnacle of every true baseball fan's year, a contest designed to
showcase the very best the sport has to offer. The greatest teams from each league face each
other in a battle to determine superiority within the sport. By committing baseball's "greatest

crime" in 1919, the participating White Sox players brought into question the integrity of the
World Series and the entire game of baseball. A large part of baseball's appeal at the time was

its perceived purity, an aspect of the game to which the "Black Sox" delivered a severe blow,
placing the sport in serious jeopardy. Comiskey knew he had to do something to restore the
sanctity of the game or risk abandonment by even the sport's most loyal followers. His crisis
management tactics would successfully prevent baseball from self-destruction. Today, the
remnants of the scandal are still evident in occasional references to Pete Rose's betting
indiscretions and sporadic uprisings of support for Joe Jackson's posthumous initiation into the
Hall of Fame. However, in the bigger picture, baseball's integrity has been generally restored.
Baseball is still plagued by a number of issues, the most prominent of which is the use of
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performance-enhancing drugs. Because of Comiskey's actions following the 1919 World Series,
any concern about betting scandals has been all but eliminated from the minds of baseball fans.
The following section will explain the actions Comiskey took to eliminate the major blemishes
the "Black Sox" scandal placed on the face of his team and the sport.
The Game Plan: Comiskey's Image Restoration Campaign

Charles Comiskey enacted his image restoration campaign in two stages. The division
between the early and late stages of the campaign was the point at which Comiskey accepted as

fact the allegations made against several of his players. In the early period of the crisis, before

Comiskey recognized the truth about the alleged scandal, his image restoration strategy focused
primarily on assuring the public that the validity of the claims would be determined and that the
guilty parties or individuals, if any, would be identified. This is an example of Benoit's
corrective action strategy (Benoit, 1995, 1997; Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Benoit & Czerwinski,
1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Kennedy & Benoit, 1997). In the course of his crusade for the

truth, Comiskey made certain the public knew precisely what measures he had taken and to what

lengths he had gone to remedy the problem. To a far lesser degree in the first stage of his
campaign, Comiskey also attempted to place the rumors in a more favorable context in an
example of transcendence, reduce the perceived severity of the problem in a display of
minimization, and discredit the source of the rumors in a representation of counterattack. The
last of these tactics also functioned as an opinion/knowledge dissociation, in which Comiskey
differentiated between speculation and fact (Hearit, 1994; 1995). However, despite the presence

of these multiple other tactics, by far the most significant strategy used in the first stage of the
Comiskey's campaign was corrective action.
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Once Comiskey convinced himself that several of his players had indeed conspired to
lose the 1919 World Series, he moved into the second stage of his campaign. This second stage

still involved heavy reliance on the use of corrective action, but the strategy was present in a new
form. While in the first stage, he used this strategy to determine what the problem was,

Comiskey now would use corrective action to assure his target audiences that a repeat of the
incident would be impossible by vowing to permanently remove the corrupt players from

professional baseball. In a manner of speaking, he promised to restore the quality of the batch by
removing the bad apples. In making such promises and taking the necessary steps to bring them
to fruition, Comiskey also distanced himself from the indicted players in a representation of an
individual/group dissociation (Hearit, 1994; 1995). The separation Comiskey created between
his organization and the corrupt players was basically a product of his corrective action efforts,
but this dissociation strategy was still crucial to his image restoration campaign. The following
section outlines the specific discourse the White Sox president used in enacting the two stages of
his image restoration campaign. This section also outlines a unique sociological condition that
allowed him to succeed by utilizing such a one-dimensional approach.

Stage One: Address and Investigate the Rumors
Comiskey's first attempts to restore the image of his baseball team fundamentally

revolved around only one strategy, corrective action. The only real attempt he made to use other
tactics came immediately after the World Series finale, when he addressed the public in what

may be identified as an example of transcendence, minimization and counterattack. In one of
Comiskey's first media addresses after the end of the Series, he delivered the following
statement in response to widely spread rumors that the games had been fixed: "There is always
some scandal of some kind following a big sporting event like the world's series. These yams are
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manufactured out of whole cloth and grow out of bitterness due to losing wagers," ("Rumors
arouse Comiskey," 1919, p. 10). In the first sentence of the statement, Comiskey exemplified the
transcendence and minimization tactics of image restoration. First, he placed the alleged
wrongful act, conspiracy to throw the World Series, in a larger and less offensive context as one

of the routine scandals that "always" follow major sporting events such as the World Series.
This is an example of transcendence (Benoit, 1995, 1997; Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Benoit &
Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Kennedy & Benoit, 1997). By downplaying the
accusations as merely another of the alleged scandals that inevitably arise after all major sporting
events, Comiskey demonstrated minimization as a means to reduce the negative sentiment, or

offensiveness, that his key audiences would have associated with the tampering of the national

pastime's most sacred contest. The second sentence of the preceding statement represents an
instance of counterattack. Comiskey's reference to the "bitterness due to losing wagers" on the

part of the people he implies are the source of the rumors was an attempt to discredit the claims
of these individuals. Comiskey suggested these people made the allegations based on emotions
and not facts, so the allegations should therefore not be considered credible. This statement also

serves as an example of an opinion/knowledge dissociation in which Comiskey attempted to
distinguish between the allegations (opinions) and the actual events (knowledge) (Hearit

1994,1995). In another section of the statement referenced above, Comiskey introduced the
crucial corrective action element of his campaign:
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I believe my boys fought the battles of the recent world's series on the level as
they have always done, and I would be the first to want information to the
contrary. I would give $20,000 to anyone unearthing any information to that
effect.

("Rumors arouse Comiskey," 1919, p. 10)

This excerpt represents the beginning of Comiskey's campaign to convey to his audiences that he
had taken corrective action to not only determine the truth, but to ensure that if the allegations

were verified, the wrongful acts would never occur again. The corrective action tactic would be
the primary component of the remainder of Comiskey's image restoration campaign.
Many of Comiskey's actions were representations of corrective action. One way in
which he exemplified this tactic was through the multiple reiterations of his offer to compensate

any individual found to have relevant information. For example, on December 14, 1919, two
months after his original statement, Comiskey "declared the investigation had not ended and that
his offer of $10,000 for proof still stood" ("No evidence found," 1919, p. 14). He did, for

reasons about which it can only be speculated, drop the reward from $20,000 to $10,000, but the
fact that he still was offering a reward for information is the most significant point. Comiskey

proclaimed the $10,000 offer again on December 30 ("Comiskey renews offer," 1919) and again
the following September during the players' trial ("Says 1919 World's Series," 1920). Each time
he renewed the offer Comiskey demonstrated to his key publics his commitment to correcting the
alleged wrongdoings.
Comiskey continued to bombard the public with messages of corrective action in other

ways as well. For instance, in December of 1919, he issued a statement describing the progress
of his investigation. It read:
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We have been investigating all these rumors and I have had men working twentyfour hours a day running down clues that promised to produce facts. Nothing has
come of them. Do not get the impression that we are through investigating. I am

still working on the case and will go to the limit to get any evidence to bear out
the truth of these accusations. If I land the goods on any of my ballplayers I will
see that there is no place in organized ball for them. There will be no

whitewashing or compromising with crooks as long as I am in the American
League. But as yet not one bit of reliable information has been turned up to prove
there was anything wrong.
("Decision reserved," 1919, p. 12)

In this progress report, Comiskey clearly displayed the tactic of corrective action in an attempt to
assure his stakeholders that the proper measures had been taken to determine the truth and

identify any guilty parties. The report also provided assurance that, should evidence of
wrongdoing be found, precautions would be taken to ensure that a repeat of the incident was

impossible. Comiskey suggested such precautions would include the permanent expulsion of
any players found guilty.

Comiskey further demonstrated corrective action tactics when he collaborated with
Chicago Cubs President William L. Veeck and American League President Ban Johnson during
the players' trial in September of 1920. The New York Times reported that all three men "stated
that they were anxious to get to the bottom of all charges, and that they were determined to push
the investigation and punish the guilty, if any" ("Says 1919 World's Series," 1920). As part of
this trio of baseball magnates, Comiskey assured his target audience that justice would be served
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by expressing a desire to determine the truth in a timely fashion and to make any guilty parties
pay for their crimes.

The White Sox owner's September 25, 1920 statement in The New York Times is another

example of corrective action. In this statement, Comiskey detailed the measures he took
immediately after first hearing about a possible conspiracy to fix the 1919 Series, before the
Series had ended ("Grand jury hears," 1920). In the article, Comiskey said he enlisted the
assistance of White Sox general manager "Kid" Gleason to "safeguard the series as far as

possible" ("Grand jury hears," 1920). He claimed he also sent Gleason to St. Louis with the
authority to reimburse a well-known gambler there for the $5,500 he lost on the Series if he
could validate his claim that he had valuable information about a fix. According to Comiskey,

Gleason's trip proved fruitless. In his September 25 statement, Comiskey also explained how he
informed John Heydler, National League President and member of the National Commission, of
the rumors. In this statement, Comiskey again made known that his $10,000 offer for
information was still on the table ("Grand jury hears," 1920).

On November 5, 1920, The New York Times published a statement by Comiskey that

described in detail each step the White Sox owner had taken to that point in his efforts to verify
the rumors of a conspiracy. This is another example of corrective action in Comiskey's image

restoration campaign. The journalist's introduction to Comiskey's statement read: "The object
of the statement is to counteract the impression prevailing in some quarters that Comiskey had

been delinquent in his duty and that any credit for the expose belonged to Ban Johnson, President
of the American League ("Comiskey reviews steps," 1920, p. 19). By using this statement to

respond to claims of nonfeasance, Comiskey reinforced his corrective action strategy. He listed
several elements of his quest for the truth, including Gleason's trip to St. Louis and the
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deployment of detectives to locations across the country to search for information. He also
revealed the $10,000 cost he incurred for these efforts. Comiskey further stated, "At no time or

place did I cease my efforts to root out the truth regarding crooked ball playing in the World's
Series of 1919" ("Comiskey reviews steps," 1920, p. 19). Furthermore, he said the following of
the actions he took immediately after the grand jury convened to deliberate on the case: "I

volunteered all information at my disposal and paid part of the expense of bringing witnesses to

testify before the Grand Jury" ("Comiskey reviews steps," 1920, p. 19). Comiskey continued to
describe his role in the trial process when he highlighted the fact that it was his lawyer who

procured the testimonies of each White Sox player who had confessed ("Comiskey reviews

steps," 1920, p. 19). In the statement discussed above, each of Comiskey's assertions regarding
his part in determining the truth behind the alleged conspiracy is an example of corrective action
as used in an image repair campaign.

Stage Two: Banish the Conspirators
Other assertions extracted from the statement in the previous paragraph indicate the

beginning of the second stage in Comiskey's campaign. At this point, Comiskey felt he had been
successful in validating the claims of corruption and began to use public discourse to distance
himself and his team from the corrupt players. For example, marking the shift in his corrective

action objectives, Comiskey informed the public that he promptly suspended the players
mentioned in the first confession shortly after he heard of their alleged involvement in the fix

("Comiskey reviews steps," 1920). This action outlines one of the first actions the White Sox
owner took to correct the situation. He removed the corrupt players from the game, though at

that point the removal was only temporary. This was a marked shift from the corrective action
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strategy Comiskey employed in the first phase of his crisis management campaign, when he
focused on the search for truth behind the allegations.

In the same statement, in an example of dissociation, Comiskey distanced himself from
the accused players by explaining the financial and emotional damage caused to him by the
indicted players' transgressions:
Even though it ruined my ball team, possibly cost me a pennant and certainly
destroyed property of a value of many hundreds of thousands of dollars, I took my

loss without a pang or a bit of sadness, other than that occasioned by ascertaining
the fact that those in whom I had put full faith and trust had violated the
confidence I had reposed in them.
("Comiskey reviews steps," 1920, p. 19)

Here, Comiskey painted himself as the victim of the guilty players' actions, drawing a clear line
between himself, as a representative of the organization, and the corrupt individuals. Though he
never explicitly stated that he wished not to be associated with the conspirators, by labeling
himself as the victim and them as the perpetrators, Comiskey attempted to relay this message to
the public. In creating a clear distinction between himself and the wrongdoers, Comiskey
exemplified an individual/group dissociation (Hearit 1994, 1995). This distinction would prove
a cmcial stepping-stone for Comiskey's later efforts to correct the wrongs the players had done
to the game of baseball.
On March 14, 1921, The New York Times reported Comiskey's response to Judge
Kenesaw Mountain Landis, official arbiter of professional baseball, announcing he had officially

made the eight indicted players ineligible to play baseball in the major leagues ("White Sox
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trial," 1921). Comiskey's words are another embodiment of his second stage corrective action
technique. Comiskey reportedly said:

Those players are on my ineligible list. It was not necessary for Judge Landis to
put them on his, but I am glad he did, as it justified my position. There is
absolutely no place for any of them to play on my team again unless they can
clear themselves to my satisfaction of the charges against them by three of their
teammates.

("White Sox trial," 1921, p.6)

In this statement, Comiskey again assured his target audiences that the crooked players would

not play baseball again, implying that this would prevent further corruption. His words here are
similar to those in the previous statement in which he described suspending the players

("Comiskey reviews steps," 1920). The difference here is that Comiskey's actions as described
in this statement are less concrete and more symbolic. He made the same point, that the

conspirators will not play baseball for him again, but he did so from a different angle, intending
to reinforce his previous sentiment.
The corrective action-based campaign took a more permanent turn when, a few days after

issuing the statement mentioned in the paragraph above, Comiskey officially and unconditionally
released the indicted players from the White Sox organization. In the published formal notice of

their release, Comiskey informed the players, "your actions have been highly detrimental to the
reputation of the club and entirely inconsistent with your obligations to it" ("Comiskey ousts
indicted players," 1921, p.9). With these words, which were printed in The New York Times,
Comiskey removed the players from his organization in an attempt to restore its image. He also
again illustrated the use of an individual/group dissociation tactic (Hearit 1994, 1995; "Comiskey
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ousts indicted players," 1921). Comiskey distanced the Chicago White Sox organization from
the accused players to make it clear to his key audiences that the ball club as a whole was not

responsible for the fix. He placed the blame solely on the shoulders of the individual players,
who could be, and in fact later were, easily removed from the larger body.
The trial of the players officially began on June 27, 1921 and ended a little more than two

months later in the acquittal of all eight men (Asinof, 1963). The day after the acquittal,
Comiskey issued another statement explaining his corrective actions, reiterating the fact that he
still would not allow any of the players to be a part of his organization, despite the fact that they
had been found innocent. He said, "Until they all are able to explain this to my satisfaction, none
of them will play with the Sox" ("Baseball leaders won't," 1921, p. 1). With this statement,
Comiskey conveyed to his target publics a genuine interest in correcting the perceived problem.

He demonstrated a willingness to take the matter of preventing another conspiracy into his own
hands if another body, in this case the court, refused to do so. This represents another tactic in
the White Sox owner's campaign to convey to the public the corrective action measures he had

taken to ensure that a repeat incident would be impossible. Comiskey's statement was joined by

similar declarations from Landis and Johnson ("Baseball leaders won't," 1921, p. 1).
The Social Motif of "Rotten Apple" Removal, Rectification and Restoration

Scientists have proven that the antiquated adage is true: "one bad apple spoils the whole
barrel" ("Harvesting and storing apples," 1999, ]f 4). A rotten apple exudes a chemical called
ethylene that triggers the ripening of the other apples, causing them to eventually rot and

continue rotting, even after the original rotten apple is removed ("Harvesting and storing apples,"
1999). As a few rotten apples can cause an entire barrel to spoil, so too, at least in the minds of

Comiskey's publics, could only a few players in professional baseball be responsible for the
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"Black Sox" scandal. When the "bad apples" or the accused players were removed from the
game, White Sox fans and the rest of the baseball community were apparently placated enough

to believe the integrity of the team and the game had been restored. Baseball players, however,
are not apples and the laws of science do not necessarily apply to image restoration efforts. The
success of Charles Comiskey's crisis management campaign following the 1919 scandal

suggests the public held the belief that the reverse of the aforementioned saying is true. People

apparently believed the integrity of major league baseball could be salvaged and restored simply
by eliminating the corrupt players.

Because of this widespread social motif, Comiskey was able to focus his image
restoration efforts around basically only one strategy, taking corrective action to prevent a
similar event from occurring by identifying and removing the "rotten" players. He implemented
this strategy because he perceived the belief in his target audiences that as long as the bad apples
were removed, those remaining would be left untainted and the barrel as a whole would be return

to a pristine state. Comiskey worked within the structure of this social motif. He repeatedly told
his audiences first that the "rotten" players would be sought out and identified, and later that they
would be removed from the barrel, thus assuring permanent resolution of the problem and

restoring the integrity of his organization. The first part of this strategy represents an
individual/group dissociation that would later serve as part of Comiskey's corrective action-

focused image restoration plan. The audience's predisposition to the belief that removal of the
corrupt players would rectify the situation made Comiskey's one-dimensional approach a
plausible image restoration strategy.

The effects of the "rotten apple" social motif are apparent in other baseball cases as well.
When Pete Rose came under fire for allegedly betting on the game, he was permanently banned
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from any involvement in professional baseball. The public accepted the removal of Rose as a
solution to the problem, when in actuality, the problem likely extended beyond only one player.

Accepting Rose's expulsion from the game as a viable solution, the public reformed its generally
favorable view of professional baseball. Rose's credibility was forever marred, but his sport's
wound healed and its credibility was for the most part restored, as evidenced by the lack of

discussion about the problem of insider betting in the current sports forum. Comiskey utilized
the social motif of rotten apple removal, rectification and restoration to aid him in restoring the
image of his Chicago White Sox team and of professional baseball in general.
Post-Game Wrap-Up: Conclusions

In the presence of widespread rumors regarding a possible conspiracy by several of his

players to throw the 1919 World Series, Charles Comiskey knew what he had to do and what he
had to work with in order to repair his organization's image in the eyes of its stakeholders.

Immediately after he was informed of the rumors, Comiskey recognized that he had two options.
The rumors had to be either proven false and dispelled or verified and addressed. He took action
to determine the validity of the accusations against his players through an apparently sincere and

comprehensive investigation, the details of which he deliberately made public. This public
inquiry into the legitimacy of the rumors eventually yielded the unimaginable. Comiskey had a
group of corrupt players on his team who were guilty of "the greatest crime it was possible to
commit in baseball ("Baseball leaders won't," 1921, p. 1).

Comiskey enacted his campaign to restore his club's image in two stages, both based
almost entirely upon examples of the corrective action strategy identified by Benoit. The first
stage entailed an investigation into the allegations and numerous statements relaying to
Comiskey's audiences the sincerity behind it. The White Sox owner expressed his resolve
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toward not only establishing the validity of the allegations, but also toward identifying any guilty

parties. Comiskey's investigation into the rumors was the first step toward ensuring that a
similar incident would not occur again on his team or in professional baseball. The White Sox
owner thus demonstrated Benoit's image restoration strategy of corrective action. Once the
investigation yielded information sufficient for Comiskey to accept the conspiracy theories as
fact, he moved into the second stage of his image restoration campaign.
The second and final phase of the campaign was similar to the first in that Comiskey

again relied almost solely on corrective action. However, the tactic was used in a different
manner. While at the beginning of the campaign, the White Sox owner demonstrated corrective
action tactics by trying to investigate the mmors and determine any guilty parties, he exemplified
these tactics in the second part of the campaign as a way to assure the impossibility of a repeat
incident by eliminating the guilty parties from his team and from the game of baseball. First,
Comiskey temporarily removed the players implicated in the scandal from his team through

suspensions while a more official investigation was conducted. When he became convinced of
their guilt, he released the players from his organization and assured his audiences those men
would never play for his team again. Finally, Comiskey reassured his stakeholders by attempting
to permanently ban the players from baseball's major leagues. These final two actions came in

spite of the fact that the players were acquitted in a court of law. Comiskey's corrective action
efforts in the second half of his campaign also served the purpose of clearly separating himself
and his organization from the accused players. He established the group of alleged conspirators
as a scapegoat, and then created a clear distinction between that group, the White Sox
organization and professional baseball. Through physical removal of the players from his

organization, he attempted to make clear in the minds of his publics that the alleged conspirators
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were no longer part of the team. This dissociation harkens back to the purpose of his secondstage corrective action efforts, in which Comiskey assured his stakeholders that another
conspiracy was impossible because the metaphorical rotten apples had been removed from the
barrel, never to be returned.

Comiskey's campaign suggests the presence of a social motif in American society. He
used to his advantage the fact that people tend to believe a problem is solved when the identified

causes of the problem have been eliminated. They believe that removal of the rotten apples will
restore the integrity of the barrel. By working within the context of this social motif, Comiskey
was able to convince his publics that the White Sox organization and the American professional
baseball institution was no longer corrupt simply by eliminating the corrupt players. In the
absence of this social motif, his stakeholders would have had no reason to accept the removal of
the players as viable assurance of restored organizational integrity and a rectified situation.
Comiskey's image restoration campaign focused almost exclusively on examples of corrective
action that relied heavily on this social motif. He would not have been able to succeed using
such a strategy had this social condition not existed.

The campaign to restore the image of the White Sox organization after the "Black Sox"

scandal of 1919 represents a paradigmatic approach to image restoration for today's baseball
organizations. The social motif of rotten apple removal, restoration and rectification persists
today. Thus, just as Comiskey did in 1919, today's baseball organization owners and
spokespeople can largely restore the images of their clubs simply by removing the individuals

identified as being directly involved in the crisis. A modem day example of an attempt to use
this paradigm is Major League Baseball's newest drug program. Professional baseball
implemented the new program to placate the governing body's critics, who called for a
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crackdown on the use of performance-enhancing drugs by the league's players. At the press
conference following the announcement of the new program, Major League Baseball
Commissioner Bud Selig described it as "a new, much tougher drug-testing program that is

designed to rid our game of performance-enhancing drugs" (Bloom, 2005, ^ 3). Under the new
program, Major League Baseball will strive for Commissioner Selig's goal of a drug-free game
by instituting more frequent mandatory testing of athletes and stricter penalties for those who test

positive. Those penalties will be assessed in the form of unpaid suspensions ranging from 10
days for a first offense up to one year for a fourth offense, with punishments for further offenses

left to the discretion of the commissioner. This leaves open the possibility for permanent
expulsion (Bloom, 2005). Selig and other Major League Baseball representatives recently were

forced to defend the new policy at a highly publicized congressional hearing, in a situation
somewhat similar to Comiskey's frequent iterations of his own corrective action tactics via local
and national media. To effectively follow Comiskey's image restoration paradigm, Major
League Baseball's new drug program must identify at least one scapegoat, as Comiskey did, then

make that individual an example of the organization's commitment to correcting the perceived
problem of rampant performance-enhancing drug use by permanently expelling him from

baseball. Additionally, throughout it's corrective action campaign, Major League baseball must
make public the actions it takes to seek out the corrupt individuals and remove them from the
game, in much the same fashion as Comiskey did when managing his own crisis. If baseball's

fans and critics are not aware of the organization's efforts, these efforts will be for naught. In his
frequent disclosures to the media, Comiskey attempted to make certain everyone affected by the
crisis knew exactly what he was doing and what he had already done. Today's baseball
spokespeople would do well to follow a similar pattern.
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Similar to what Comiskey did more than 80 years ago to restore the image of his

team, Major League Baseball's new program is designed to assure the public that guilty
individuals will be identified and prevented from further contaminating the game of

baseball. While the preliminary punishments stipulated by the new program are not as
harsh as those ultimately levied by Comiskey and the league following the "Black Sox"

scandal, the message is the same: the league is taking action to remove the "bad apples."
The new drug program has already come under some criticism for allegedly not doing

enough to correct the problem, but in the words of one team owner, "This is real
progress" (Bloom, 2005, ^ 8). The true test of Comiskey's corrective action-centered
image restoration campaign as a paradigm for today's sports institution will come after

the public has time see baseball's new drug program in action and to weigh in on its
efficacy. If the public views the program as a viable means to cleanse the game, then
steroid abuse will ultimately become an issue of the past and the nation's faith in the

national pastime will be restored, just as it was after Comiskey's campaign more than 80
years ago.
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